Generating good revenue is one of the most important problems in Bayesian auction design, and many (approximately) optimal dominant-strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) Bayesian mechanisms have been constructed for various auction settings. However, most existing studies do not consider the complexity for the seller to carry out the mechanism. It is assumed that the seller knows "each single bit" of the distributions and is able to optimize perfectly based on the entire distributions. Unfortunately this is a strong assumption and may not hold in reality: for example, when the value distributions have exponentially large supports or do not have succinct representations.
Introduction
formal definitions provided in Section 5.1. Similar assumptions are widely adopted in sampling mechanisms [33, 18] , to deal with irregular distributions with unbounded supports. Since distributions with bounded supports automatically satisfy the small-tail assumptions, the lower-bounds listed for the former apply to the latter as well. Table 1 : Our main results. Here h(·) < 1 is the tail function in the small-tail assumptions. For single-item auctions, the revenue is a (1 + ǫ)-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue, with ǫ sufficiently small. For multi-item auctions with unit-demand or additive valuation functions, the revenue is a c-approximation for some constant c.
Auctions
Also note that our lower-and upper-bounds on query complexity are tight for bounded distributions. As will become clear in Section 3 and Appendix A, our lower-bounds allow the seller to make both value and quantile queries, and apply to any multi-player multi-item auctions where each player's valuation function is succinct sub-additive: formal definitions in Appendix A. The lower-bounds also allow randomized queries and randomized mechanisms.
For the upper-bounds, all our query schemes are deterministic and only make one type of queries: value queries for bounded distributions and quantile queries in the other cases; see Sections 4 and 5. We show that our schemes, despite of being very efficient, only loses a small fraction of revenue compared with when the seller has full access to the distributions.
Discussions
Sample Complexity. A closely related area to our work is sampling mechanisms [15, 3, 28, 19, 30, 18, 21, 22, 6] . It assumes that the seller does not know D but observes independent samples from D before the auction begins. The sample complexity measures how many samples the seller needs so as to obtain a good approximation to the optimal Bayesian revenue. The best-known sample complexity results are summarized in Table 2 .
Oracle queries can be seen as targeted samples, where the seller actively asks the information he needs rather than passively learns about it from random samples. As such, it is intuitive that queries are more efficient than samples, but it is a priori unclear how efficient queries can be. Our results answer this question quantitatively and show that query complexity can be exponentially smaller than sample complexity: the former is logarithmic in the "size" of the distributions, while the latter is polynomial.
Finally, the design of query mechanisms facilitates the design of sampling mechanisms. If the seller observes enough samples from D, then he can mimic quantile queries and apply query mechanisms: see Appendix E for more details.
Auctions
Single-Item (regular) [18] Single-Item (bounded) [18] Unit-Demand (bounded) [30] Additive (bounded) [ Parametric Auctions. Parametric mechanisms [2, 1] assume the seller only knows some specific parameters about the distributions, such as the mean, the median (or a single quantile), and the variance. Note that using quantile or value queries, one can get the exact value of the median and the approximate value of the mean, and then apply parametric mechanisms. However, existing parametric mechanisms only consider single-parameter auctions, where the distributions are regular or have monotone hazard rate. Since our mechanisms make non-adaptive oracle queries, our results imply parametric mechanisms in multi-parameter settings with general distributions, where the "parameters" are the oracle's answers to our query schemes. Our lower-bounds imply that knowing only the median is not enough to achieve the same approximation ratios as we do. Finally, it remains unknown whether constant approximations can be achieved for multi-parameter auctions or general distributions, knowing only the mean and the variance.
Distributions within Bounded Distance. Recently, [6] studies auctions where the true prior distribution is unknown to the seller, but he is given a distribution that is close to the true prior, as measured by the Kolmogorov distance. On the one hand, the learnt distributions from our query schemes can be far from the true prior in terms of the Kolmogorov distance, thus their mechanisms do not apply. On the other hand, although a distribution close to the true prior may be learnt via sufficiently many oracle queries, our lower-bounds imply that the query complexity of this approach will not be better than ours.
Using Experts as Oracles. If the players' value distributions are known by some experts, then the seller can use the experts as oracles. Indeed, we are able to design proper scoring rules [5, 11] for the seller to elicit truthful answers from the experts for his queries. If the experts are actually players in the auctions, then they have their own stakes about the final allocation and prices, and it would be interesting to see how the seller can still use them as oracles and get truthful answers for his queries, while keeping them truthful about their own values. See [14] for more discussions on this front.
Other Related Works
The complexity of auctions is an important topic in the literature, and several complexity measures have been considered. Following the taxation principle [24, 23] , [26] defines the menu complexity of truthful auctions. For a single additive buyer, [17] shows the optimal Bayesian auction for revenue can have an infinite menu size or a continuum of menu entries, and [4] shows a constant approximation under finite menu complexity. Recently, [20] considers the taxation, communication, query and menu complexities of truthful combinatorial auctions, and shows important connections among them. The queries considered there are totally different from ours: we are concerned with the complexity of accessing the players' value distributions in Bayesian settings, while [20] is concerned with the complexity of accessing the players' valuation functions in non-Bayesian settings.
Future Directions
Many interesting questions about the query complexity of Bayesian auctions are worth exploring. First, as mentioned, we focus on non-adaptive queries in this work. One can imagine more powerful mechanisms using adaptive queries, where the seller's later queries depend on the oracle's responses to former ones. It is intriguing to design approximately optimal Bayesian mechanisms with lower query complexity using adaptive queries, or prove that even with such queries, the query complexity cannot be much better than our lower-bounds. Another interesting direction is when the answers of the oracle contain noise. In this case, the distributions learnt by the seller may be within a small distance from the "true distributions" defined by oracle answers without noise. This is related to [6] and it would be interesting to design mechanisms to handle such noise.
Preliminaries

Bayesian Auctions
In a multi-item auction there are m items, denoted by M = {1, . . . , m}, and n players, denoted by N = {1, . . . , n}. Each player i ∈ N has a non-negative value for each item j ∈ M , v ij , which is independently drawn from distribution D ij . Player i's true valuation is (v ij ) j∈ [m] . To simplify the notations, we may write v i for (v ij ) j∈ [m] and v for (v i ) i∈ [n] . Letting D i = × j∈M D ij and D = × i∈N D i , we use I = (N, M, D) to denote the corresponding Bayesian auction instance and OP T (I) the optimal BIC revenue of I. When I is clear from the context, we write OP T for short.
We will consider several classes of widely studied auctions. A single-item auction has m = 1. When m > 1, a bidder i being unit-demand means his value for a subset S of items is max j∈S v ij , and a bidder i being additive means his value for S is j∈S v ij . When all bidders are unit-demand (respectively, additive), we call such an auction a unit-demand auction (respectively, an additive auction) for short.
Query Complexity
In this work, we only allow the seller to access the prior distributions via two types of oracle queries: value queries and quantile queries. Given a distribution D over reals, in a value query, the seller sends a value v ∈ R and the oracle returns the corresponding quantile q(v) Pr x∼D [x ≥ v]. In a quantile query, the seller sends a quantile q ∈ [0, 1] and the oracle returns the corresponding value v(q) such that Pr x∼D [x ≥ v(q)] = q. With non-adaptive queries, the seller first sends all his queries to the oracle, gets the answers back, and then runs the auction. The query complexity is the number of queries made by the seller.
Note that the answer to a value query is unique. The quantile queries are a bit tricky, as for discrete distributions there may be multiple values corresponding to the same quantile q, or there may be none. When there are multiple values, to resolve the ambiguity, let the output of the oracle be the largest one: that is, v(q) = arg max z {Pr x∼D [x ≥ z] = q}. When there is no value corresponding to q, the oracle returns the largest value whose corresponding quantile is larger than q: that is, v(q) = arg max z {Pr x∼D [x ≥ z] > q}. So for any quantile query q, v(q) = arg max z {Pr x∼D [x ≥ z] ≥ q} in general. For any discrete distribution D and quantile query q > 0, v(q) is always in the support of D. When q = 0, v(q) may be +∞.
Lower Bounds
In this section, we prove lower bounds for the query complexity of Bayesian mechanisms, and we focus on DSIC mechanisms. As a building block for our general lower bound, we first have the following for single-item single-player auctions, proved in Appendix A.1.
Lemma 1.
For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for any large enough H, any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M making less than C log c H (randomized) non-adaptive value and quantile queries to the oracle, there exists a single-player single-item Bayesian auction instance I = (N, M, D) where the values are bounded in [1, H] , such that Rev(M(I)) < OP T (I) c . We extend this lemma to arbitrary multi-player multi-item Bayesian auctions with succinct subadditive valuations, as follows, with the corresponding definitions and the proof of the theorem deferred to Appendix A.2. Theorem 1. For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for any n ≥ 1, m ≥ 1, any large enough H, any succinct sub-additive valuation function profile v = (v i ) i∈ [n] , and any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M making less than Cnm log c H non-adaptive value and quantile queries to the oracle, there exists a multi-item Bayesian auction instance I = (N, M, D) with valuation profile v, where |N | = n, |M | = m and the item values are bounded in [1, H] , such that Rev(M(I)) < OP T (I) c . Succinct sub-additive valuations is a very broad class and contains single-item, unit-demand, and additive auctions as special cases. Thus Theorem 1 automatically applies to those cases. We also note that it is shown in [36] that the optimal BIC revenue exceeds the optimal DSIC revenue by a constant factor even for two i.i.d. additive bidders and two identical items. So even with infinite samples, there exist constants c > 1 such that no c-approximation to OP T is possible. However, Theorem 1 is stronger: for every constant c > 1, one needs at least the given number of queries to get a c-approximation.
The Query Complexity for Bounded Distributions
In this section, we consider settings where all distributions are bounded within [1, H] , and we construct efficient query mechanisms whose query complexity matches our lower-bounds. We show that it is sufficient to use only value queries, and we define in Section 4.1 a universal query scheme A V , which will be used as a black-box in our mechanisms. The seller uses algorithm A V to learn a distribution D ′ = × i∈N,j∈M D ′ ij that approximates the prior distribution D and is stochastically dominated by D. The seller then runs existing DSIC Bayesian mechanisms using D ′ , while the players' values are drawn from D. In this sense, all our mechanisms are simple, but they are not given a true Bayesian instance as input.
The multi-player single-item setting is already non-trivial, but still easy, since we have a good understanding of the optimal mechanism, which is Myerson's auction [31] . In particular, in the analysis it suffices to apply the revenue monotonicity theorem of [18] . The situation for unitdemand auctions and additive auctions is much more subtle. The optimal auction could be very complicated and may involve lotteries and bundling, and revenue monotonicity may not hold [27] . Even (disregarding complexity issues and) assuming we can design an optimal Bayesian mechanism for D ′ , it is unclear how much revenue it guarantees when the players' values come from the true distribution D. To overcome this difficulty, we rely on recent developments on simple Bayesian mechanisms with approximately optimal revenue.
The mechanism for unit-demand auctions is sequential post-price [29] and the analysis is relatively easy. For additive auctions, the Bayesian mechanism either runs Myerson's auction separately for each item or runs the VCG mechanism with a per-player entry fee [35, 9] . However, an easy and direct analysis would lose a factor of m in the query complexity. To achieve a tight upper-bound, we need to really open the box and analyze the mechanism differently in several crucial places, exploring its behavior under oracle queries.
To sum up, given our query scheme, our mechanisms are black-box reductions to simple Bayesian mechanisms, thus are simple, natural, and easy to implement in practice, while the analysis is nonblack-box, non-trivial and reveals interesting connections between Bayesian mechanisms and query schemes.
The Value-Query Algorithm
The query algorithm A V is defined in Algorithm 1. Here D ∈ ∆(R) is the distribution to be queried. The algorithm takes two parameters, the value bound H and the precision factor δ > 0, makes O(log 1+δ H) value queries to the oracle, and then returns a discrete distribution D ′ . It is easy to verify that D ′ is stochastically dominated by D. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the mean of
. Therefore, by directly applying the parametric mechanism in [1] with parameter mean(D ′ ) (for single-parameter auctions where the distributions are regular or MHR), we will get at least a (1 + δ) fraction of their revenue.
The value bound H and the precision factor δ.
1: Let k = ⌈log 1+δ H⌉ and define the value vector
Query the oracle for D with v, and receive a non-increasing quantile vector q = (q(v 0 ), · · · , q(v k )) = (q l ) l∈{0,...,k} . Note q 0 = 1. 3: Construct a discrete distribution D ′ as follows: D ′ (v l ) = q l − q l+1 for any l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where
Single-Item Auctions and Unit-Demand Auctions
Denoting by M M RS Myerson's mechanism for single-item auctions, Mechanism 2 defines our efficient value Myerson mechanism M EV M .
Mechanism 2 Efficient Value Myerson Mechanism M EV M
1: Given the value bound H and a constant ǫ > 0, run the value-query algorithm A V with H and δ = ǫ for each player i's distribution
Run M M RS with D ′ and the players' reported values, b = (b i ) i∈N , to get allocation x = (x i ) i∈N and price profile p = (p i ) i∈N as the outcome.
The query complexity of
In this section and throughout the paper, we often analyze "mismatching" cases where a Bayesian mechanism M uses distribution D ′ while the actual Bayesian instance is I = (N, M, D) (i.e., the players' true values are drawn from D). We use Rev(M(I; D ′ )) to denote the expected revenue in this case. By construction, Rev(M EV M (I)) = Rev(M M RS (I; D ′ )).
Because the distribution D ′ constructed in M EV M is stochastically dominated by D, letting I ′ = (N, M, D ′ ) be the Bayesian instance under D ′ , by revenue monotonicity [18] we have
1+ǫ . Thus we have the following simple result. 
Run M U D with D ′ and the players' reported values, b = (b ij ) i∈N,j∈M , to get allocation x = (x ij ) i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (p i ) i∈N as the outcome.
The main difficulty for unit-demand auctions is that we no longer have revenue monotonicity as in single-item auctions. Our analysis then comes in a non-blackbox way and relies on the COPIES setting [12, 29] , which provides an upper-bound for the optimal BIC revenue. By properly upperbounding the optimal revenue in the COPIES setting under D ′ , we are able to upper-bound the optimal revenue in unit-demand auctions using the expected revenue of M EV U D . More precisely, we have the following theorem, proved in Appendix B.1. 
Additive Auctions
For additive auctions, the DSIC Bayesian mechanism in [35, 9] chooses between two mechanisms, whichever generates higher expected revenue under the true prior D. The first is the "individual Myerson" mechanism, denoted by M IM , which sells each item separately using Myerson's mechanism. The second is the VCG mechanism with optimal per-player entry fees, denoted by M BV CG .
In our mechanism M EV A , the seller queries about D using algorithm A V with properly chosen parameters. Given the resulting distribution D ′ , the seller either runs M IM or runs M BV CG as a blackbox, resulting in query mechanisms M EV IM and M EV BV CG . We only define the latter in Mechanism 4, and the former simply replaces M BV CG with M IM . Note that Rev(M EV IM (I)) = Rev(M IM (I; D ′ )) and Rev(M EV BV CG (I)) = Rev(M BV CG (I; D ′ )). However, the seller cannot compute these two revenue and choose the better one, because he does not know D. Thus he randomly chooses between the two, according to probabilities defined in our analysis, to optimize the approximation ratio. We have the following theorem, proved in Appendix B.2. Theorem 4 is harder to show. Indeed, one cannot use revenue monotonicity or the COPIES setting to easily upper-bound the optimal BIC revenue. Our analysis is based on the duality framework of [9] for Bayesian auctions, properly adapted for the query setting. Finally, letting c = 8(1 + ǫ), we have the query complexity in Table 1 . 
Run M BV CG with D ′ and the players' reported values, b = (b ij ) i∈N,j∈M , to get allocation x = (x ij ) i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (p i ) i∈N as the outcome.
The Query Complexity for Unbounded Distributions
Next, we construct efficient query mechanisms for arbitrary distributions whose supports can be unbounded. For a mechanism to approximate the optimal Bayesian revenue using finite non-adaptive queries to such distributions, it is intuitive that some kind of small-tail assumption for the distributions is needed. Indeed, given any mechanism with query complexity C, there always exists a distribution that has a sufficiently small probability mass around a sufficiently large value, such that the mechanism cannot find it using C queries. If this probability mass is where all the revenue comes (e.g., all the remaining probability mass is around value 0), then the mechanism cannot be a good approximation to OP T . Following the literature [33, 18] , the small-tail assumptions are such that the expected revenue generated from the "tail" of the distributions is negligible compared to the optimal revenue; see Section 5.1. Distributions with bounded supports automatically satisfy these assumptions, so are regular distributions in single-item auctions. Even with small-tail assumptions, it is hard to generate good revenue from unbounded distributions with finite value queries. Instead, we show it is sufficient to use only quantile queries. As before, the seller uses our quantile-query algorithm A Q (defined in Section 5.2) to learn a distribution D ′ that approximates D, and then reduces to simple mechanisms under D ′ . However, even for single-item auctions, it is not so simple to show why the combination of these two parts work. Indeed, under value queries it is easy to "under-price" the item so that the probability of sale is the same as in the optimal mechanism for D. Under quantile queries, under-pricing may lose a large amount of revenue because, for given quantiles, there is no guarantee on where the corresponding values are. Instead, the main idea in using quantile queries is to "over-price" the item. This is risky in many auction design scenarios, because it may significantly reduce the probability of sale, and thus lose a lot of revenue. We prove a key technical lemma in Lemma 2 for single-item auctions, where we show that by discretizing the quantile space properly, we can over-price the item while almost preserving the probability of sale as in the optimal mechanism under D. In Lemma 4 of Appendix C, we prove another technical lemma showing that proper over-pricing can also be done in additive auctions.
Note that we can get the median of a distribution simply by querying the quantile 1/2. Then, for single-parameter auctions with regular distributions, using the parametric mechanism in [1] we get the same revenue as theirs. However, our query mechanisms can handle multi-parameter auctions and irregular distributions.
Small-Tail Assumptions
A Bayesian auction instance I satisfies the Small-Tail Assumption 1 if there exists a function 1 h : (0, 1) → (0, 1) such that, for any constant δ 1 ∈ (0, 1) and any BIC mechanism M, letting
Here
) is the revenue of M under the Bayesian instance I when the true valuation profile is v, and I is the indicator function. For discrete distributions, Equation 1 is imposed on the ǫ 1 probability mass over the highest values. Equation 1 immediately implies the following weaker Small-Tail Assumption 2: there exists a function h : (0, 1) → (0, 1) such that, for any constant δ 1 ∈ (0, 1) , letting ǫ 1 = h(δ 1 ), we have
Here Rev OP T (v; I) is the revenue generated by the optimal BIC mechanism for I when the true valuation profile is v. Similar assumptions are widely adopted in sampling mechanisms to deal with irregular distributions with unbounded supports.
The Quantile-Query Algorithm
We define our quantile-query algorithm A Q in Algorithm 5. As before, D ∈ ∆(R) is the distribution to be queried. The algorithm takes two parameters, the tail length ǫ 1 and the precision factor δ, makes O(log 1+δ
) quantile queries to the oracle, and then returns a discrete distribution D ′ .
Algorithm 5
The Quantile-Query Algorithm A Q Input: the tail length ǫ 1 and the precision factor δ.
Query the oracle for D with q, and receive a non-decreasing value vector (v l ) l∈{0,...,k} . 3: Construct a distribution D ′ as follows: D ′ (v l ) = q l −q l+1 for each l ∈ {0, . . . , k}, where q k+1 0. Output: Distribution D ′ .
Single-Item Auctions
Mechanism 6 defines our efficient quantile Myerson mechanism M EQM . Before proving Theorem 5, we first claim the following key lemma, which we prove in Appendix C.1 via an imaginary Bayesian mechanism that "over-prices". Recall
Mechanism 6 Efficient Quantile Myerson Mechanism
quantile queries for each player and there are n players in total. By definition,
Combining these two equations with Lemma 2, Theorem 5 holds.
Mechanism M EQM and Theorem 5 immediately extend to single-parameter downward-closed settings. Finally, when the distributions are regular, we are able to prove an even better query complexity and a matching lower-bound; see Section 6.
Unit-Demand Auctions
The unit-demand mechanism M EQU D is similar (see Mechanism 7), and we have the following.
Run mechanism M U D with D ′ and the players' reported values, b = (b ij ) i∈N,j∈M , to get allocation x = (x ij ) i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (p i ) i∈N as the outcome.
The proof of Theorem 6 is similar to that of Theorem 3, but Lemma 2 above is used instead of Lemma 5 of [18] , and the round-down scheme is replaced by the randomized round-down scheme designed in the proof of Lemma 2. The details have been omitted.
Additive Auctions
For additive auctions, we cannot use Small-Tail Assumption 2, because it does not imply that the revenue loss on the tail by running M BV CG is much less than the revenue of the optimal mechanism. To approximate M BV CG , not only we need Small-Tail Assumption 1, but we also approximate D by running the quantile-query algorithm A Q with different parameters. The resulting mechanism M EQBV CG is defined in Mechanism 8, and the mechanism M EQIM simply replaces M BV CG with M IM . Again, in the final mechanism M EQA the seller randomly chooses between the two query mechanisms, according to probabilities defined in the analysis. We have the following theorem, proved in Appendix C.2.
Mechanism 8 Mechanism M EQBV CG for Additive Auctions
Run M BV CG with D ′ and the players' reported values, b = (b ij ) i∈N,j∈M , to get allocation x = (x ij ) i∈N,j∈M and price profile p = (p i ) i∈N as the outcome. The main advantage of using quantile queries is to handle unbounded distributions. In addition, we can use the resulting query mechanisms to construct sampling mechanisms; see Appendix E. As shown in Theorem 7, the query complexity of mechanism M EQA has an extra factor of m compared with that of M EV A (and the lower bound). It would be interesting to see whether our lower-bounds can be improved in this scenario.
Using Quantile Queries for Bounded Distributions
As a corollary, Theorems 5, 6 and 7 also provide another way to approximate the optimal BIC revenue using only quantile queries when the distributions are bounded. More precisely, we have the following, proved in Appendix C.3. ) quantile queries for single-item auctions and unit-demand auctions, and use O(m 2 n log 1+ǫ
) quantile queries for additive auctions, whose approximation ratios to OP T are respectively 1 + ǫ, 24(1 + ǫ) and 8(1 + ǫ).
Single-Item Auctions with Regular Distributions
In this section, we show that when we only consider regular distributions for single-item auctions, the query complexity can be much lower. In fact, we no longer need the small-tail assumptions even when the supports are unbounded. Here our lower-and upper-bounds are tight upto a logarithmic factor, and require different techniques from previous sections.
For the lower-bound, recall that in Section 3 we allow the distributions to be irregular. To construct the desired distributions, we can first find the un-queried quantile interval and then move the probability mass from its end points to internal points. Because the distributions can be irregular, we have complete control on where to put the probability mass. However, if the distributions have to be regular then this cannot be done. Instead, we start from two different single-peak revenue curves and construct regular distributions from them. We still want to move probability mass from the end points of the un-queried quantile interval to internal points, but such moves must be continuous in order to preserve regularity.
For the upper-bound, we show that regular distributions satisfy the small-tail property with a properly defined tail function. Thus our techniques for distributions with small-tails directly apply here.
Lower Bound
With regular distributions, by [19] it is sufficient to use a single sample to achieve 2-approximation in revenue for single-player single-item auctions. Because every distribution is a uniform distribution in the quantile space, a sample for such auctions can be obtained by first choosing a quantile q uniformly at random from [0, 1] and then making a quantile query. Thus, a single query is also sufficient for 2-approximation in this case. As such, unlike Theorem 1 where we have proved lower bounds for the query complexity for arbitrary constant approximations, for regular distributions we consider lower bounds for (1 + ǫ)-approximations, where ǫ is sufficiently small. More precisely, we have the following, proved in Appendix D.1. 
Upper Bound
Our mechanism M EM R (i.e., "Efficient quantile Myerson mechanism for Regular distributions") first constructs the distribution D ′ that approximates D using the quantile-query algorithm A Q with parameters δ = Following [15, 28, 18] , the sample complexity for single-item auction with regular distributions is bounded between Ω(max{nǫ −1 , ǫ −3 }) andÕ(nǫ −4 ). However, each sample is a valuation profile of the players, and thus contains n values. When ǫ is small, the query complexity in this setting is O(nǫ −1 log n ǫ ). Thus the query complexity is still much lower than the sample complexity.
A Missing Materials for Section 3
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1 Lemma 1 (restated). For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for any large enough H, any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M making less than C log c H (randomized) non-adaptive value and quantile queries to the oracle, there exists a single-player single-item Bayesian auction instance I = (N, M, D) where the values are bounded in [1, H] 
Proof. Given c, for any constant H, let k ⌊ 1 4 log (8c) 4c+2 H⌋. When H is large enough, we have
We divide the quantile interval [0, 1] and the value interval [1, H] into k + 1 sub-intervals, with their right-ends defined as follows:
(4c) 4c+2 for each s ∈ {k − 1, . . . , 0}. It is easy to see
From now on, we will ignore the intervals below u 0 and q 0 .
Let
. We have C log c H < k(1 − c ′ ). Accordingly, for any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M that makes less than C log c H non-adaptive value and quantile queries, there exist a value interval (u s , u s+1 ) and a quantile interval (q t , q t+1 ) such that, with probability at least c ′ , no value in (u s , u s+1 ) is queried and no quantile in (q t , q t+1 ) is queried either. Indeed, if this is not the case, then for any pair (u s , u s+1 ) and (q t , q t+1 ), with probability greater than 1 − c ′ , either (u s , u s+1 ) is queried or (q t , q t+1 ) is queried. Since there are k value intervals and k quantile intervals, the expected total number of queries made by M is at least k(1 − c ′ ) > C log c H, a contradiction.
We now construct ⌈4c⌉ different single-player single-item Bayesian instances
, where the distributions outside the value range (u s , u s+1 ) and the quantile range (q t , q t+1 ) are all the same. Given such D z 's, with probability at least c ′ = 1 − 1 2c mechanism M cannot distinguish the I z 's from each other. We then show that when this happens, mechanism M cannot be a 2c-approximation for all instances I z .
More precisely, the distribution D z for each z ∈ [⌈4c⌉] is defined in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 1 . Here δ is a small constant whose value will be determined in the analysis. Table 4 . Accordingly, with probability at least 1 −
The cumulative probability function of D z . 
Quantile queries Corresponding values Oracle's answer
we analyze the revenue of M. Since M is DSIC, the allocation rule must be monotone in the player's bid, and he will pay the threshold payment set by M, denoted by P . Here P may also be randomized. Note that for all instances, setting P < 4cu s is strictly worse than setting P = 4cu s , and setting P > (4c) ⌈4c⌉ u s is strictly worse than setting P = (4c) ⌈4c⌉ u s < u s+1 . Also, for any instance I z and any z ′ ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈4c⌉ − 1}, setting P ∈ ((4c) z ′ u s , (4c) z ′ +1 u s ) is strictly worse than setting P = (4c) z ′ +1 u s . Thus, when mechanism M cannot distinguish the I z 's, it must use the same P for all I z 's, and the best it can do is to set P = (4c) z u s with some probability ρ z for each z ∈ [⌈4c⌉]. Because z∈[⌈4c⌉] ρ z = 1, there exists z * such that ρ z * ≤ 1 4c . Thus we have
where the first inequality is because for any threshold other than (4c) z * u s , the resulting expected revenue is no larger than that with the threshold being (4c) z * −1 u s . That is, when M cannot distinguish the I z 's, it cannot be a 2c-approximation for I z * .
As the revenue of M under I z * is at most OP T (I z * ) when it is able to distinguish I z * from all the other instances, we have
Thus M is not a c-approximation for I z * , and Lemma 1 holds.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
To make our exposition clearer, we first introduce some notations. A very broad class of Bayesian auctions, (monotone) sub-additive auctions, is such that each player i has a valuation function 
Note that such auctions include single-item, unit-demand and additive auctions as special cases.
Theorem 1 (restated). For any constant c > 1, there exists a constant C such that, for any n ≥ 1, m ≥ 1, any large enough H, any succinct sub-additive valuation function profile v = (v i ) i∈ [n] , and any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M making less than Cnm log c H non-adaptive value and quantile queries to the oracle, there exists a multi-item Bayesian auction instance . Let H be large enough so that k ≥ 1. It is easy to see that Cnm log c H < nmk 3c . Thus, for any DSIC Bayesian mechanism M that makes less than Cnm log c H non-adaptive value and quantile queries, there exists a player-item pair (i * , j * ), a value interval (u s , u s+1 ) and a quantile interval (q t , q t+1 ) such that, with probability at least 1 − 1 3c , M does not query these two intervals for player i * 's value distribution for item j * . We will focus on i * , j * and the two intervals, and show that M cannot generate good revenue from them.
We construct ⌈4c⌉ Bayesian instances,
ij is the prior distribution for the players' item values. For each z, i, j, the distribution Table 3 . Given any succinct sub-additive valuation function profile v = (v i ) i∈ [n] where each v i takes a vector of item-values (v ij ) j∈[m] as part of its input, we would like to compare the optimal revenue for the sub-additive instances defined by the I z 's with the corresponding expected revenue of M. By construction, the D z 's differ only at the D z i * j * 's, within the value interval (u s , u s+1 ) and the quantile interval (q t , q t+1 ). Accordingly, with probability at least 1 − 1 3c , mechanism M cannot distinguish the I z 's from each other. Eventually, we will analyze the revenue of M conditional on this event happening.
For now, to compare the optimal revenue and that of M, let us first introduce some notations. For any item-value profilev = (v ij
Moreover, for each item j, let x ij (v) be the probability that player i receives item j according to
We upper-bound the revenue of M in three steps. To begin with, we reduce the multi-player subadditive instances to single-player sub-additive instances, and construct a DSIC Bayesian mechanism M * that only sells the items to player i * . Given any instance I z , mechanism M * runs on the single-player sub-additive instance I z i * = ({i * }, M, D z i * ). It first simulates the item values of players in N \ {i * }, which are all 1's, and then runs M. Mechanism M * answers the oracle queries of M truthfully. The allocation and the payment for player i * under M * is the same as those under M. For any player i = i * , mechanism M * assigns nothing to him and charges him 0, because i is an imaginary player to M * . It is easy to see that mechanism M * is DSIC. Moreover,
because the revenue generated by M from players in N \ {i * } is at most their total value for the allocation. Next, we reduce the single-player sub-additive instances to single-player additive instances, and construct a DSIC Bayesian mechanism M + that runs on the single-player additive instances
. Note that each I +z i * has the same item-value distributions as I z i * , but player i * 's value for any subset of items is additive.
For each single-player sub-additive instance defined by I z i * and the valuation function profile v, by the taxation principle [23] , mechanism M * is equivalent to providing a menu of options to player i * and then letting i * choose a menu entry maximizing his expected utility according to his true valuation. Given any instance I +z i * , mechanism M + provides the same menu as mechanism M * under I z i * and v, except that the payment in each entry is discounted by a multiplicative 1 −ǫ. Herê ǫ is a sufficiently small constant in (0, 1) to be determined later in the analysis. The truthfulness of M + is immediate, because it lets i * choose a menu entry maximizing his expected utility under his true additive values. Let
the expected maximum difference between the additive values and the succinct sub-additive values. Following Lemma 3.4 in [34] , which compares the revenue in the sub-additive instance with that in the corresponding additive instance, we have
Finally, we reduce the single-player additive instances to single-player single-item instances, and construct a DSIC Bayesian mechanism M ′ that only sells item j * to player i * . Mechanism M ′ runs on the single-player single-item instances i * j (v i * ) be the probability that player i * receives item j in the allocation. Mechanism M ′ sets its outcome to be the following:
may be negative. By Lemma 21 of [25] , mechanism M ′ is DSIC and
Now we combine the above three reduction steps together and consider the event when mechanism M cannot distinguish the I z 's from each other. When this happens, mechanism M produces the same outcome for all the instances. Accordingly, although mechanism M * is given the distributions D z i * , by simulating M, it still produces the same outcome for all the I z i * 's, thus the same menu for all of them. So mechanism M + also produces the same menu for all the I +z i * 's: that is, the menu produced by M * with the payments discounted by 1 −ǫ. As a result, although mechanism M ′ is given the D z i * j * 's, it still cannot "distinguish" the I z i * j * 's from each other and produces the same outcome for all of them. Following the proof of Lemma 1, in this case there exists
Combining this inequality with Equations 3, 4 and 5, we have
Note that OP T (I z * i * j * ) ≤ OP T (I z * ), since selling a single item to a single player is a feasible outcome. Moreover, since D z * ij is constantly 1 when i = i * or j = j * , and since the valuation function profile v is succinct sub-additive, we have
Here the second equation is because
, we have
Finally, we combine Equation 7 with the probability that M cannot distinguish the I z 's, which is 1 − 
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
B Missing Proofs for Section 4
B.1 Unit-Demand Auctions
Before analyzing mechanism M EV U D , let us first recall the sequential post-price mechanism M U D . This mechanism processes the players one by one according to an arbitrary order, computes a price for each player i based on remaining items, remaining players and the prior distribution, and lets i choose his utility-maximizing item (or choose none). The revenue of this mechanism is analyzed by reducing the unit-demand instance to the COPIES setting, which we introduce below. For a unit-demand auction instance I = (N, M, D), the corresponding COPIES instance is denoted by I CP = (N CP , M CP , D), where each player i ∈ N has m copies and each item j ∈ M has n copies, and player i's copy j is only interested in item j's copy i, with value v ij drawn independently from D ij . Thus N CP = M CP = N × M , and I CP is a single-parameter instance. Denote by N i the set of player i's copies and by M j the set of item j's copies. Note that both {N i } i∈N and {M j } j∈M are partitions of N CP (and M CP ). Two natural constraints are imposed on feasible allocations under the COPIES setting, so as to connect it with the original unit-demand setting: (1) for each player i, at most one of his copies gets an item; and (2) for each item j, at most one of its copies gets allocated. Accordingly, letting q s be the probability that a feasible mechanism allocates an item to a player copy s ∈ N CP , we have s∈N i q s ≤ 1 for each i ∈ N and s∈M j q s ≤ 1 for each j ∈ M .
The corresponding mechanism M CP U D for the COPIES setting works in the same way as M U D , except that it considers an arbitrary order of the players in N CP , thus different copies of the same player may not be processed together. When evaluating the performance of mechanism M CP U D , the order of the players is chosen by an online adaptive adversary, who tries to minimize the expected revenue of the mechanism. Because this adversary is the worst-case for mechanism M CP U D ,
for any distribution D ′ , where the latter is the expected revenue of M CP U D under the online adaptive adversary. Indeed, mechanism M U D can be considered as M CP U D under a specific order where all copies of each player come together, thus the revenue is at least that when the order of N CP is adaptively chosen by the adversary. Now we are ready to prove Theorem 3. 
Proof. It is easy to see that the query complexity of
Below we prove the revenue bound. By construction,
Let I ′ = (N, M, D ′ ) and I ′CP = (N CP , M CP , D ′ ). We state the following key lemma, which is proved after the proof of Theorem 3.
. By Theorem 1 of [29] , the sequential post-price mechanism is at least a 6-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue in the COPIES setting. Thus
Next, because the COPIES setting is a single-parameter setting, and because of the way we discretize the value space in algorithm A V , by Lemma 5 of [18] we have
Finally, by Theorem 6 of [9] , the optimal BIC revenue in the COPIES setting is a 4-approximation to the optimal BIC revenue in the original unit-demand setting. Thus
Combining Equations 8, 9, 10, 11 and Lemma 3, Theorem 3 holds. 
and Pr
That is, if v is distributed according to D then v ′ is distributed according to D ′ . For any value profile v and the corresponding v ′ , arbitrarily fix an order σ of the players in N CP , which is a bijection from {1, · · · , mn} to {1, · · · , mn}. Without loss of generality, each player σ(s) gets the corresponding item σ(s) whenever his true value is greater than or equal to the posted price for him. Below we show that mechanism M CP U D produces the same outcome no matter the players' true values are v or v ′ . That is, for any s ∈ {1, . . . , mn}, Now assume (1) and (2) hold for any s ≤ t with t < mn. We show they also hold for s = t + 1. Indeed, the inductive hypothesis implies that for any s ≤ t, A σ(s) is the same under the two value profiles. In particular, A σ(t+1) is the same, which means the price p σ(t+1) is the same. Thus property (1) holds. Property (2) also holds because a realization of p σ(t+1) is always in the support of D ′ σ(t+1) . In sum, for any order σ, mechanism M CP U D produces the same outcome under the two value profiles v and v ′ , thus the same revenue. 
Similarly,
and Lemma 3 holds.
B.2 Additive Auctions
Theorem 4 (restated). ∀ǫ > 0, for any additive instance I = (N, M, D) with values in [1, H], mechanism M EV A is DSIC, has query complexity O(mn log 1+ǫ H), and
Proof. First, it is easy to see that the query complexity of mechanism M EV A is O(mn log 1+δ H), since there are in total mn distributions and each one of them needs O(log 1+δ H) value queries in the algorithm A V . Since δ = √ ǫ + 1 − 1, O(mn log 1+δ H) = O(mn log 1+ǫ H). Second, since mechanisms M BV CG and M IM are both DSIC, M EV A is DSIC.
Recall that mechanism M EV A randomly chooses between running M EV IM and running M EV BV CG . Therefore, to upper-bound the optimal revenue OP T (I) using Rev(M EV A (I)), we only need to upper-bound OP T (I) using Rev(M EV IM (I)) and Rev(M EV BV CG (I)).
As in [9] , we only need to consider the prior distribution D with finite support. Let V ij be the support of D ij for each player i and item j, V i = × j∈M V ij and V = × i∈N V i . In the optimal BIC mechanism, when player i bids v i , let π ij (v i ) be the probability for him to get item j and p i (v i ) be his expected payment, taken over the randomness of the other players' values and the randomness of the mechanism. Let π = (π ij (v i )) i∈N,j∈M,v i ∈V i and p = (p i (v i )) i∈N,v i ∈V i . The pair (π, p) is called the reduced form (of the optimal BIC mechanism) [7] .
Denote byφ ij (v ij ) Myerson's (ironed) virtual value when player i's value on item j is v ij . For any value sub-profile v −i of the players other than i, let β ij (v −i ) = max i ′ =i v i ′ j : that is, the highest bid on item j excluding player i. Moreover, let r ij (
, and finally r = i r i . Note that r is the expected revenue by running the 1-look-ahead mechanism of [32] for each item separately, and r ≤ Rev(M IM (I)).
Next, we use a different method from [9] to partition each player i's value space V i into m + 1 subsets. More precisely, given δ > 0 and
, let j = arg max{v ij − (1 + δ)β ij (v −i )} with ties broken lexicographically, and add v i to the set R 
where
and
In the following, we bound these terms in Inequality 12 separately. Note that when M EV IM uses the value-query algorithm A V to learn a distribution, the parameters are also set to be H and δ = √ ǫ + 1 − 1. Thus, applying Theorem 2 to each item, we have
For the terms Single, Under, Over and Tail, we are able to upper-bound them using Rev(M EV IM (I)). Following Lemma 13 of [9] , although the term Single has changed from its original form, we still have
Next, using Lemmas 14 and 15 of [9] , we upper-bound the term Under as follows:
The second inequality above is by Lemmas 14 and 15 of [9] , which respectively upper-bound the term Over and the term Under in the original setting. Indeed, we split our term Under into the sum of the original terms Under and Over. Using the above equation, the approximation ratio to OP T (I) will be 9(1 + ǫ) eventually. To get the desired 8(1 + ǫ)-approximation, we prove a variant of Lemma 15 of [9] , which directly upper-bounds our term Under as
The actual proof of this alternative lemma is tedious and does not provide new insights to our result, thus has been omitted. Next, we upper-bound the term Over:
The second inequality above is by Lemma 14 of [9] . Next, we upper-bound the term Tail, which is similar to the analysis of [9] , but with the threshold price β ij (v −i ) scaled up by a factor of (1 + δ).
The second inequality above is by union bound. The fourth and sixth inequalities use twice the definition of r ij (v −i ), which sets the optimal price to maximize the expected revenue generated by selling item j to i. The second equality is by the definition of r i (v −i ). Finally, we upper-bound the term Core. The Core part is the most complicated, and we use M EV BV CG and M EV IM together to upper-bound it. To do so, below we rewrite Core into a different form. Similar to [9] , arbitrarily fixing v −i and letting v ij ∼ D ij , define the following two new random variables, which again scale the threshold price β ij (v −i ) up by a factor of (1 + δ):
Therefore, we have
. 
In the following, we use the revenue of mechanisms M EV BV CG and M EV IM to bound the Core. To do so, first note that by the construction of mechanism M EV BV CG , 
The inequality is because each player i can potentially buy item j only when j is in his winning set (i.e., he is the highest bidder for j), and i's winning set under v ′ i is a subset of his wining set under v i . Moreover, the entry fee of i is the same under both 
As before, arbitrarily fixing
is a random variable that represents player i's utility in the second price mechanism on item j with value v ′ ij ∼ D ′ ij , when the other players' bids are v −i,j . Also note that M BV CG uses the optimal entry fee for each i with respect to v −i and D ′ , which generates expected revenue from i (over D ′ i ) greater than or equal to that by using the following entry fee,
Now we show player i accepts the entry fee e ′ i (v −i ) with probability at least 
The inequality is because v ′ ij ≥ v ij 1+δ , and because
as desired. Thus we have
That is,
Combining Inequalities 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17,
Accordingly, by running mechanism M EV BV CG with probability 1 4 and mechanism M EV IM with probability i that is less than or equal to v i , no matter whether D i is continuous or discrete. Under quantile queries, when D i is continuous, the same deterministic round-down scheme still works. However, the situation is more subtle when D i is discrete, and we need a randomized round-down scheme to ensure the relationship between v i and v 
and to v ′ i;l (i.e., v
Following this scheme, it is not hard to verify that 
Again, under value queries, the resampling is simply conditional on
l , no matter whether D i is continuous or discrete. Under quantile queries, this resampling scheme still works when D i is continuous. When D i is discrete, we need to "undo" the randomized round-down scheme defined above. More precisely, letting v ′ i = v ′ i;l , v i is set to be v ′ i;l+1 with probability
) with probability
and is set to be v ′ i;l with probability
.
Following this resampling scheme, it is not hard to verify that v i is distributed according to D i whenever v ′ i is distributed according to D ′ i . Given the round-down and the resampling schemes above, we consider the Bayesian mechanism M * defined in Mechanism 9 for I ′ , and compare its revenue with that of M M RS . We first claim that M * is a DSIC mechanism, and prove it after the proof of Lemma 2.
Mechanism 9 A Bayesian mechanism M * for instance I ′ 1: Each player i reports his value v ′ i , and the mechanism discards the report that is not in V ′ i . 2: For each player i, generate value v i according to v ′ i using our resampling scheme. 3: Run M M RS with the value profile v and the prior distribution D, to get the price p i and the allocation x i ∈ {0, 1} for each player i. 4 : If x i = 1 and p i ≤ v ′ i , sell the item to i and charge him p i ; otherwise, set x i = 0 and p i = 0.
To analyze the revenue of M * , note that by construction, when v ′ i is distributed according to
Here the first equality holds because of the relationship between D ′ and D as established by our rounding and resampling schemes, and because each player i in M * pays the same threshold price as in mechanism M M RS whenever v ′ i is at least the threshold, and pays 0 otherwise. By the construction of the distribution D ′ , we have the following claim, with proof provided after the proof of Lemma 2.
, Claim 2 and Small Tail Assumption 2, we are able to lower-bound the revenue of M * as follows, which is also proved after the proof of Lemma 2. We now prove the claims used above.
Proof. Because M M RS is DSIC, each x i is monotone in v i . Although v i is a random variable given v ′ i , it is easy to see that for any two different values 
Claim 2 (restated). Pr
k , then both probabilities are 0 and the inequality holds.
Below we consider the case
as desired. Indeed, the first inequality is because v 
. The seventh equality is by the definition of the round-down scheme. The following two equalities and the inequality are by the construction of D ′ i and the definition of the quantile vector q. Indeed,
. Finally, the last equality is again by the definition of the round-down scheme.
Proof. Combining Equation 18 and Claim 2, we have
Accordingly,
Here the second last equality holds by the definition of p i (v −i ; D) and Rev OP T (v; I), and last inequality holds by the Small-Tail Assumption 2. Since δ = ǫ 3 and δ 1 = 2ǫ 3(1+ǫ) , we have
thus Claim 3 holds.
C.2 Additive Auctions
Before proving Theorem 7, we first analyze mechanism M EQBV CG , and we have the following. Proof. First, mechanism M EQBV CG is DSIC because M BV CG is DSIC. The query complexity is also immediate. We now focus on the revenue of this mechanism. We explicitly write M BV CG (I; D ′ ) to emphasize the fact that the seller runs mechanism M BV CG on the true valuation profile v ∼ D, but uses D ′ to compute the entry fees e i . Given a player i and a valuation profile v, 
To do so, first, for any player i, item j and value v ij , if v ij < v ′ ij;k where v ′ ij;k is the largest value in V ′ ij , then denote by v ij the smallest value in V ′ ij that is strictly larger than v ij ; otherwise, let v ij = v ij . Moreover, denote by v ij the largest value in V ′ ij that is weakly smaller than v ij . The valuation v i and v i are defined correspondingly given v i . Then We have
Below we upper-bound the last two lines in Equation 24 separately. For the first part, we have
The inequality above is because v ij ≤ v ij for each player i and item j, which implies I j:v ij ≥β ij
Next, by the definition of the quantile vector q, for any u ij ∈ V ′ ij we have
Indeed, when
. Since all distributions are independent, for any u i ∈ V ′ i we have
Combining Equations 25 and 26, we have By Equations 24 and 27, we have
For the last line of Equation 28 , we have
The first inequality above is because, for each player i and valuation profile v, Note that the total query complexity is still O(−m 2 n log 1+ 
The last inequality above holds because 2M BV CG (I) + 6M IM (I) ≥ OP T (I) [9] . Thus Theorem 7 holds. ) quantile queries for additive auctions, whose approximation ratios for OP T are respectively 1 + ǫ, 24(1 + ǫ) and 8(1 + ǫ).
Proof. We only need to show that the Small-Tail Assumptions 1 and 2 are naturally satisfied when the distributions have bounded supports. For example, consider additive auctions where all values are in [1, H] , as considered in [28, 15] . Then mH and 1 are straightforward upper-and lowerbounds for OP T (I), respectively. Moreover, by individual rationality, mH is an upper-bound for the revenue generated under any valuation profiles. Given δ 1 , let ǫ 1 = h(δ 1 ) = δ 1 m 2 nH and denote by E the event that there exist at least one player i and one item j with q ij (v ij ) ≤ ǫ 1 . By the union bound, 
D Missing Proofs for Section 6
D.1 Lower Bound
We only prove Theorem 8 for the single-player case, as in the following lemma. The lower bound for general multi-player single-item auctions can be proved using the same technique as in Theorem 1, thus the full proof has been omitted. Proof. Since the distributions are unbounded, we can always construct the distributions such that for any finite number of value queries, the responses for the value queries have almost none contribution to the optimal revenue. Thus we only need to focus on the lower bound for quantile queries.
Letting k ⌈ 1 δǫ ⌉ and C
1−2δǫ
2δ . Here δ is a constant to be determined later and δ, ǫ satisfies that k ≥ 2. In our construction, we divide the quantile interval [0, 1] into k + 1 sub-intervals each, with the right-end points defined as follows: from left to right, q 0 = 0, q t+1 = q t + δǫ for each t ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}.
Accordingly, for any Bayesian mechanism M that makes less than C ǫ non-adaptive quantile queries, there exists a quantile interval (q t , q t+1 ) such that, q t+1 ≤ 1 − 2δǫ and with probability at least 1 2 , no quantile in (q t , q t+1 ) is queried. Indeed, if this is not the case, then with probability at least 1 2 , all the quantile intervals except (1 − 2δǫ, 1 − δǫ) and (1 − δǫ, 1) are queried. Since there are at least k − 2 quantile intervals, the expected total number of queries made by M is at least
We now construct two different single-player single-item Bayesian instances
where the distributions outside the quantile range (q t , q t+1 ) are all the same. Thus with probability at least 1 2 , mechanism M cannot distinguish the I z 's from each other. We then show that when this happens, mechanism M cannot be a (1 + 3ǫ)-approximation for all instances I z .
Let R be a parameter that is large enough such that no value query will get any useful response. Then the first distribution D 1 with value bounded within [0, R qt ] is defined as follows, where F 1 (·) is the cumulative probability function of D 1 .
That is there is a probability mass 
The revenue curve R 1 (q) is illustrated figure 2. The second distribution D 2 with value bounded within [0,
R qt ] is defined as follows, where F 2 (·) is the cumulative probability function of D 2 . Let v * = R(2−δǫ) 2(1−δǫ)−(2−δǫ)(1−q t+1 ) . Since q t+1 ≤ 1 − 2δǫ, v * > 0 is well defined and it is easy to check v * < R qt .
That is, there is a probability mass q t at value R qt and a two-step continuous distribution within [q t , q * ] and [q * , q t+1 ]. Thus for any quantile in range (0, q t ], the oracle will response R qt . It can be calculated that the quantile of value v * is q * = 1 − 
. Therefore the revenue function with related to the quantile q is
The revenue curve R 2 (q) is illustrated figure 3.
The revenue curve of D 2 .
Indeed when the quantile query is from [0, q t ] ∪ [q t+1 , 1], the oracle's answers for all distributions are the same. Accordingly, with probability at least 1 2 , mechanism M cannot distinguish D z 's from each other, which means it cannot distinguish I z 's from each other, as desired.
Since M is truthful, the allocation rule for the player must be monotone and he will pay the threshold payment set by M, denoted by P . Let P * = (4−δǫ)R 4(1−δǫ)−(4−δǫ)(1−q t+1 ) . Here P may be randomized. Recall that OP T (I 1 ) = R 1−δǫ . If with probability 1 2 setting the price P ≤ P * , then for instance I 1 , we have 
E Applications: Sampling Mechanisms
Using our techniques for query complexity, we can easily construct sampling mechanisms for multiparameter auctions. Currently, the sample complexity for unit-demand auctions and additive distributions has been upper-bounded in [3, 30, 21, 6] for bounded auctions. In this section, we provide another way to explicitly construct sampling mechanisms for both unit-demand and additive auctions, for arbitrary distributions with small-tails (and for bounded distributions).
The idea is to use samples to approximate quantile queries. Mechanism 11 defines our sampling mechanism M SM . Recall that mechanisms M M RS , M U D and M A are known (approximately) optimal DSIC mechanisms for single-item, unit-demand and additive auctions respectively. Note that in mechanism M SM , we use a different method to discretize the quantile space for additive auctions, so as to further reduce its sample complexity. In particular, we have the following theorem. Proof. After constructing the distributions, we simply run the existing DSIC mechanisms as a Blackbox, and if the constructed distribution satisfies the property that for any quantile q l ,
all our query complexity results for single-item and unit-demand auctions directly apply here. Since here for sampling mechanism, we slice the quantile interval uniformly, in the ideal case, the selected sampled values correspond to the desired quantiles and D ij (v
). However, since these samples are random, we may not obtain the ideal case. In fact, given parameter d = 12+3ǫ ǫ , if for any quantile q l ,
for any ǫ > 0, that is, Equantion 33 holds. In the following, we show how many samples are enough to obtain Inequality 34.
First, we bound the probability that v 
all our query complexity results for additive auctions directly apply here. In fact, if for any quantile q l , q l − ǫ 1 ( 1 2 − 1 1 + (1 + ) 1/m )) −2 ) for additive auctions. We note that our resulting sampling mechanisms are not better than the best-known sample complexity results as shown in Table 2 . However, our mechanisms are able to deal with unbounded distributions satisfy small-tail assumptions.
